The economics profession has long had difficulty with popular concepts of "Good Society," concepts that derive from public norms, practices and traditions that often seem incommensurable with economic theory. And yet we can see from the public reaction to the recent financial crisis that we as economists cannot avoid considering such concepts, and particularly at this point in history, cannot avoid evaluating their embodiment in financial institutions.
The Good Society is a human invention, represented by laws, customs, procedures and organizations, that encourages all the complex basic patterns of actual human behavior into an effective and congenial whole. It is a construct for the real world, for the diversity of human attitudes and purposes.
Not everyone is "good" in the Good Society.
The deep question is whether our institutions contribute to a system that is realistically better than alternatives in helping people to pursue their individual goals. This question is thrown into stark relief with our financial crisis.
In this paper I will consider these issues, and conclude that redesigning finance to advance the Good Society entails consideration of a wide variety of factors, both from theoretical finance and from psychology, history and culture. We as educators are in our best element when we represent the full complexity of the subject to our students. If we do that we help those of them pursuing careers in business and finance to inform their best sense of mission.
I. An Example of the Problems

Revealed by the Crisis
The collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) is a financial invention that divides up cash flows of pools of mortgages into tranches of various levels of riskiness. The core idea, which was extolled by finance theorists such as Claire Hill and Gary Gorton, is to create from a class of hard-to-evaluate risky assets a subclass of riskless securities that is information-acquisition-insensitive, that is, that anyone can quickly judge as riskless without an expensive process of information collection, and without fear of being picked off by unscrupulous promoters of bad products. The Aaa tranches would be easily sold to the public, while the remaining tranches, including the "toxic waste," would be retained by issuers or sold to knowledgeable speculators. This practice would result in benefits to society, in making mortgage credit more available. It has been claimed since then by many that the complexity of these CMOs was unnecessary and that it was introduced only to obfuscate, to confuse the rating agencies so that they gave artificially high ratings, so that innocents could be lured by a false sense of security to purchase investments that were not in their interest. Indeed, the collapse of some Aaa-rated CMOs apparently was a sign of Alhough these terms appear nowhere in the Act, they might plausibly be studied by the Office that the Act creates. The issues that the financial crisis raises are by no means exclusively moral issues, though the public may tend to think so.
IV Financial Speculation, Larger Society, and Its Traditions
There is a tendency to think that speculation is inherently purely selfish, but this is not necessarily so. and irreligious speculative activity that we see can be offset by the other activities that speculation, at least in some circumstances, supports.
The teaching of finance and its value system is a precursor to financial regulation. It can ultimately set the stage for improving the social norms in business even further, and making for a yet better society.
